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Abstract
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is one of the most prevalent attacks that an organizational
network infrastructure comes across nowadays. We propose a deep learning based multi-vector
DDoS detection system in a software-defined network (SDN) environment. SDN provides flexi-
bility to program network devices for different objectives and eliminates the need for third-party
vendor-specific hardware. We implement our system as a network application on top of an SDN
controller. We use deep learning for feature reduction of a large set of features derived from
network traffic headers. We evaluate our system based on different performance metrics by
applying it on traffic traces collected from different scenarios. We observe high accuracy with a
low false-positive for attack detection in our proposed system.
Keywords: Network security, Deep Learning, Multi-vector DDoS detection, Software Defined
Networking
1 Introduction
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks results in unavailability of network services by con-
tinuously flooding its servers with undesirable traffic. Low-price Internet subscriptions and readily
available attack tools led to a vast increase in volume, size, and complexity of these attacks in the
recent past. According to the forecast of Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI) [1], DDoS incidents
will reach up to 17 million in 2020, a threefold increment compared to 2015. The nature of attacks
has also changed to being multi-vector rather than having a single type of flooding. A study reported
that 64% attacks until mid-2016 were multi-vectors that include TCP SYN floods and DNS/NTP
amplification combined together [10]. Adversaries or hacktivists use DDoS attacks for extortion,
revenge, misguided marketing, and online protest. Many financial, public sector, media, and social
entertainment sites are recent victims [9, 2, 11] and suffered from monetary and reputation damages.
Therefore, detection and mitigation of these attacks in real-time have become a prime concern for
large organizations.
Recently, both software-defined networking (SDN) and deep learning (DL) have found several use-
ful and interesting applications in the industry as well as the research community. SDN provides cen-
tralized management, global view of the entire network, and programmable control plane; makes net-
work devices flexible for different applications. These features of SDN offer better network monitoring
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and enhanced security of the managed network compared to traditional networks [30, 33]. On the
other hand, DL based approaches outperformed existing machine learning techniques when applied to
various classification problems. They improve feature extraction/reduction from a high-dimensional
dataset in an unsupervised manner by inheriting the non-linearity of neural networks [31]. Re-
searchers have also started to apply DL for the implementation of various intrusion detection systems
and observed desirable results discussed in Section 2. In this work, we implement a DDoS detection
system that incorporates stacked autoencoder (SAE) based DL approach in an SDN environment
and evaluate its performance on a dataset that consists of normal Internet traffic and various DDoS
attacks.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses related work on DDoS detection
in an SDN environment and use of DL for network intrusion detection. Section 3 gives an overview of
SDN and SAE. In Section 4, we discuss the architecture of our proposed system. Section 5 presents
experimental set-up and performance evaluation of the system. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper with future work directions.
2 Related Work
We discuss the related work from two perspectives, one in which DL has been used for network
intrusion detection and the other in which DDoS detection is addressed in an SDN environment.
2.1 Intrusion detection using DL
In [29], Mostafa et al. used deep belief network (DBN) based on restricted Boltzmann machine
(RBM) for feature reduction with support vector machine (SVM) as a classifier to implement a
network intrusion detection system (NIDS) on NSL-KDD [34] intrusion dataset. In [13], Ugo et al.
used discriminative RBM (DRBM) to develop a semi-supervised learning based network anomaly
detection and evaluated its performance in an environment where network traffic for training and
test scenarios were different. They used real-world traffic traces and KDD Cup-99 [4] intrusion
dataset in their implementation. In [14], Gao et al. used RBM based DBN with a neural network as
a classifier to implement an NIDS on KDD-Cup 99 dataset. In [17], Kang et al. proposed an NIDS
for the security of in-vehicular networks using DBN and improved detection accuracy compared to
previous approaches. In [26], we implemented a deep learning based NIDS using NSL-KDD dataset.
We employed self-taught learning [28] that uses sparse autoencoder instead of RBM for feature
reduction and evaluated our model separately on training and test datasets. In [21], Ma et al.
proposed a system that combines spectral clustering (SC) and sparse autoencoder based deep neural
network (DNN). They used KDD-Cup99, NSL-KDD, and a sensor network dataset to evaluate the
performance of their model.
2.2 DDoS detection in SDN environment
In [12], Braga et al. proposed a light-weight DDoS detection system using self-organized map
(SOM) in SDN. Their implementation uses features extracted from flow-table statistics collected at
a certain interval to make the system light-weight. However, it has limitation in handling traffic
that does not have any flow rules installed. In [15], Giotis et al. combined an OpenFlow (OF) and
sFlow for anomaly detection to reduce processing overhead in native OF statistics collection. As
the implementation was based on flow sampling using sFlow, false-positive was quite high in attack
detection. In [20], Lim et al. proposed a DDoS blocking application (DBA) using SDN to efficiently
block legitimately looking DDoS attacks. The system works in collaboration with the targeted
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servers for attack detection. The prototype was demonstrated to detect HTTP flooding attack.
In [24], Mousavi et al. proposed a system to detect DDoS attacks in the controller using entropy
calculation. Their implementation depends on a threshold value for entropy to detect attacks which
they select after performing several experiments. The approach may not be reliable since threshold
value will vary in different scenarios. In [35], Wang et al. proposed an entropy based light-weight
DDoS detection system by exporting the flow statistics process to switches. Although the approach
reduces the overhead of flow statistics collection in the controller, it attempts to bring back the
intelligence in network devices.
In contrast to the discussed work, we use SAE based DL model to detect multi-vector DDoS
attacks in SDN. We use a set of large number of features extracted from network packet headers and
then use DL to reduce this set in an unsupervised manner. We apply our model on traffic dataset
collected in different environments. The proposed system attempts to detect attacks on both the
SDN control plane and the data plane, and is implemented completely on the SDN controller.
3 Background Overview
We discuss SDN and SAE before describing our DDoS detection system.
3.1 Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
As discussed earlier, the SDN architecture decouples the control plane and data plane from net-
work devices, also termed as ‘switches’, and makes them simple packet forwarding elements. The
decoupling of control logic and its unification to a centralized controller offers several advantages
compared to the current network architecture that integrates both the planes tightly. Administra-
tors can implement policies from a single point, i.e. controller, and observe their effects on the entire
network that makes management simple, less error-prone, and enhances security. Switches become
generic and vendor-agnostic. Applications that run inside a controller can program these switches
for different purposes such as layer 2/3 switch, firewall, IDS, load balancer using API offered by a
controller to them [19].
Figure 1a shows the SDN architecture with its different planes and applications. Switches, end
hosts, and communication between them form the data plane. The controller is either a single server
or a group of logically centralized distributed servers. The controller can run on commodity hardware
and communicates with switches using standard APIs called southbound interfaces. One of the de
facto standards for southbound interfaces is OpenFlow (OF) protocol [22]. The controller servers
communicate with each other using east-westbound interfaces. Network applications communicate
with the controller using northbound interfaces.
The controller and switches exchange various types of messages using OF protocol over either a
TLS/SSL encrypted or open channel. These messages set-up switch connection with the controller,
inquire network status or manage traffic flows in the network. Switches have flow tables for flow
rules that contain match-fields, counters, and actions to handle traffic flows in the network. SDN
defines flow as a group of network packets that have same values for certain packet header fields.
The controller installs flow rules for traffic flows based on the policies dictated by the network
applications.
Flow rule installation takes place in switches either in reactive mode or proactive mode. The
reactive mode works as follows. When a packet enters a switch, it looks up for a flow rule inside
its flow tables that matches with the packet headers. If a rule exists for the packet, the switch
takes an action that may involve packet forwarding, drop or header modification. If a table-miss
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(a) Different planes and network ap-
plications in SDN
(b) Reactive traffic flow set-up in SDN [27]
Figure 1: An SDN architecture and basic traffic flow in SDN
happens, i.e., there are no flow rules for an incoming flow, the switch sends a packet in message to
the controller that encapsulates packet headers for the incoming flow. The controller extracts packet
headers from the received message and sends a packet out or flow mod message to switches for the
received packet’s flow. The controller installs flow rules inside switches using flow mod messages and
switches perform actions on subsequent packets of the installed flow, without forwarding them to
the controller. Figure 1b demonstrates the reactive mode set-up in SDN. Flow rules may expire after
a certain time to manage the limited memory size of switches. The controller does not install rules
in switches, instead, it instructs them to forward the packet from a single or multiple port(s) using
packet out messages. In contrast, the controller pre-installs flow rules into switches in proactive
mode.
3.2 Stacked Autoencoder (SAE)
Stacked Autoencoder (SAE) is a DL approach that consists of stacked sparse autoencoders and soft-
max classifier for unsupervised feature learning and classification, respectively. We discuss sparse
autoencoder before SAE. A sparse autoencoder is a neural network that consists of three layers in
which the input and output layers contain M nodes, and the hidden layer contains N nodes. The
M nodes at the input represent a record with M features, i.e., X = {x1, x2, ..., xm}. For the training
purpose, the output layer is made an identity function of the input layer, i.e., Xˆ = X shown in
Figure 2a. The sparse autoencoder network finds optimal values of weight matrices, U ∈ <N×M and
U ′ ∈ <M×N , and bias vectors, b1 ∈ <N×1 and b1′ ∈ <M×1 while trying to learn an approximation of
the identity function, i.e. Xˆ ≈ X using back-propagation algorithm [25]. Many different functions
are used for activation of hidden and output nodes, we use Sigmoid function, g(z) = 11+e−z , for the
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Figure 2: A stacked autoencoder based deep learning model
activation of gU,b1 shown in Eqn. 1:
gU,b1(X) = g(UX + b1) =
1
1 + e−(UX+b1)
(1)
J =
1
2r
r∑
i=1
‖Xi − Xˆi‖2 + λ
2
(
∑
n,m
U2 +
∑
m,n
U ′2
+
∑
n
b1
2 +
∑
n
b1
′2) + β
N∑
j=1
KL(ρ‖ρˆj) (2)
Eqn. 2 represents the cost function for optimal weight learning in sparse autoencoder. It is
minimized using back-propagation. The first term in the RHS represents an average of sum-of-
square errors for all the input values and their corresponding output values for all r records in the
dataset. The second term is a weight decay term with λ as the decay parameter to avoid over-fitting.
The last term is a sparsity penalty term that puts constraint on the hidden layer to maintain low
average activation values and expressed using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence shown in Eqn. 3:
KL(ρ‖ρˆj) = ρlog ρ
ρˆj
+ (1− ρ)log 1− ρ
1− ρˆj (3)
where ρ ∈ {0, 1} is a sparsity constraint parameter and β controls the sparsity penalty term.
The KL(ρ‖ρˆj) becomes minimum when ρ = ρˆj , where ρˆj is the average activation value of a hidden
unit j over all the training inputs.
Multiple sparse autoencoders are stacked with each other in a way that the outputs of each layer
is fed into the inputs of the next layer to create an SAE. Greedy-wise training is used to obtain
optimal values of the weight matrices and bias vectors for each layer. For illustration, the first layer,
g, on raw input x is trained to obtain U , U ′, b1, b1′. The layer g encodes the raw input, X, using U
and b1. Then, the encoded values are used as inputs to train the second layer to obtain parameters
V , V ′, b2, b2′ shown in Figure 2b. This process goes further until the last hidden layer is trained.
The output of last hidden layer is fed into a classifier. Finally, all layers of SAE are treated as a
single model and fine-tuned to improve the performance of the model shown in Figure 2c.
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TCP UDP ICMP
Src IP Window Src IP Src IP
Dst IP SYN Dst IP Dst IP
Src Port ACK Src Port ICMP Type
Dst Port URG Dst Port ICMP Code
Protocol FIN Protocol Protocol
Data Size RST Data Size Data Size
TTL PUSH TTL TTL
Table 1: Different headers extracted from TCP, UDP, and ICMP packets
4 Implementation of DDoS Detection System
In an SDN, attacks can occur either on the data plane or control plane. Attacks on the former are
similar to traditional attacks and affect a few hosts. However, attacks on the latter attempt to bring
down the entire network. In this second kind of attack, adversaries fingerprint an SDN for flow
installation rules and then send new traffic flows, resulting in flow table-misses in the switch [32].
This phenomenon forces the controller to handle every packet and install new flow rules in switches
that consume system resources on the controller and switches. In our previous work [27], we
empirically evaluated the impact of SDN adversarial attacks on network services. In the current
work, we implement a DDoS detection system as a network application in SDN to handle attacks
for both cases.
Figure 3: A DDoS detection system implemented in SDN
The detection system consists of three modules as shown in Figure 3: i) Traffic Collector and Flow
installer (TCFI), ii) Feature Extractor (FE), and iii) Traffic Classifier (TC). It should be emphasized
here that to minimize false-positives, our system relies on every packet for flow computation and
attack detection instead of sampling flows using some tools such as sFlow.
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Algorithm 1: TCFI Module
Data: Incoming network packets at the controller
Result: List of extracted packet headers for TCP, UDP, and ICMP
begin
packets list←− ∅
flows list←− ∅
while Timer for the FE is not triggered do
Receive a packet from switch
Store headers in packets list
if Packet arrives due to flow table miss then
Compute flow for the packet
Compute symmetric flow, symflow, for flow
if symflow ∈ flows list then
Remove symflow from flows list
Install flow rule for symflow in switch(es)
Install flow rule for flow in switch(es)
else if flow /∈ flows list then
Add flow in flows list
Output the packet to desired port
else
Output the packet to desired port
4.1 Traffic Collector and Flow Installer (TCFI)
The TCFI module runs concurrently with the FE and TC modules which are triggered using a timer
function. It examines OF message type for an incoming packet at the controller. A message type
determines the reason for a packet’s arrival which is either due to a flow table-miss or an installed
flow rule that forwards a packet towards the controller and desired physical ports. The TCFI extracts
various header fields from a packet to identify its flow. A flow in TCP or UDP traffic is a group of
packets having same values for protocol type, source and destination IP addresses, and source and
destination port numbers. An ICMP flow has similar header fields, except for port numbers it has
ICMP message type and code. The TCFI extracts few more header fields from a packet that help
in features extraction from flows. It stores all of these extracted headers in a list for every packet
coming to the controller. Table 1 shows the headers for TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic that the TCFI
extracts. It performs this task when a packet arrives due to pre-installed flow rules.
However, when a packet arrives due to a flow table-miss, it performs following tasks in addition
to the one mentioned above. It looks up a symmetric flow corresponding to the packet’s flow in
the flow list. Two flows are symmetric for TCP or UDP traffic if the source IP address and port
number of one flow are similar to the destination IP and port number of the other, and vice-versa.
For ICMP traffic, two flows are symmetric if they are request and response types. If a symmetric
flow exists for an incoming flow, then it installs forwarding rules for both of them in SDN switches
and removes the symmetric one from the list. The rules include an action that forwards packets to
desired physical ports and the controller for the incoming and its symmetric flows. The reason for
installing rules only for symmetric flows is built on the assumption that attackers, in general, spoof
their IP addresses to prevent responses towards them from victims. Therefore, the TCFI installs
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flow rules for legitimate traffic and avoids any flow table saturation attacks in switches. If it does
not find any symmetric flow for an incoming packet, it looks up whether a flow already exists in the
list for the same. If a flow exists, it forwards the packet from switches without installing any rules.
Otherwise, it adds the packet’s flow in the list and then forwards it. Algorithm 1 shows various
steps involved in the TCFI. Although the algorithm appears similar to maximum entropy detector
in [23], i) it considers flow in general instead of flags based ii) a packet arrives at the controller
either due to a table-miss or a forwarding rule towards the controller. iii) it stores packet headers
for each packet arrives at the controller.
4.2 Feature Extractor (FE) and Traffic Classifier (TC)
The detection system triggers the FE module using a timer function. The FE takes packet headers
from the packets list populated by the TCFI and extracts features from them for a set interval and
resets the packet list to store headers for the next interval. Table 2, 3, and 4 show the list of 68
features that the FE extracts for TCP (34), UDP (20), and ICMP (14) flows, respectively. We
derived this feature set after detailed literature survey and use SAE to reduce it. The FE computes
these features for all hosts in a network which has incoming traffic flows for that particular interval.
Although we perform computations on all packets in the network, we extract features by grouping
them in flows. The FE computes median for a number of bytes and packets per flow in feature #
9-12, 43-46, and 63-67. It computes the entropy, H(F ), for feature # 8, 14, 16, 18, 20, 42, 48, 50,
54, 62, and 68 which is defined as follows:
H(F ) = −
n∑
i=1
fi∑n
j=1 fj
× log2 fi∑n
j=1 fj
(4)
where set F={f1, f2, ..., fn} denotes the frequency of each distinct value. Once the FE extracts these
features, it invokes the TC module implemented using SAE. It classifies traffic in one of the eight
classes which includes one normal and seven types of DDoS attack classes based on TCP, UDP or
ICMP vectors that adversaries launch either separately or in combinations.
5 Experimental Set-up, Results, and Discussion
To evaluate our system, we collected network traffic from a real network and a private network
testbed. We discuss them along with the performance evaluation results.
5.1 Experimental Set-up
We used a home wireless network (HWN) connected to the Internet for normal traffic collection. The
HWN comprised of around 12 network devices including laptops and smartphones. These devices
were not uniformly active for all the time which led to variation in the traffic intensity. We saved
HWN traffic of 72 hours in a Linux system using tcpdump [7] and port mirroring at a Wi-Fi access
point. The traffic of first 48 hours were used as normal flows. The traffic of last 24 hours was mixed
with the attack data that we collected separately and it was labeled as an attack in the presence
of normal traffic. The collected traffic comprises data from web browsing, audio/video streaming,
real-time messengers, and online gaming. To collect attack traffic, we created a private network in
a segregated laboratory environment using VMWare ESXi host. The private network consists of 10
DDoS attacker and 5 victim hosts. We used hping3 [3] to launch different kinds of DDoS attacks
with different packet frequencies and sizes. We launched one class of attack at a time so that it can
be labeled easily while extracting features. After traffic collection in trace files, we created an SDN
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# Feature Description
1 # of incoming TCP flows
2 Fraction of TCP flows over total incoming flows
3 # of outgoing TCP flows
4 Fraction of TCP flows over total outgoing flows
5 Fraction of symmetric incoming TCP flows
6 Fraction of asymmetric incoming TCP flows
7 # of distinct src IP for incoming TCP flows
8 Entropy of src IP for incoming TCP flows
9 Bytes per incoming TCP flow
10 Bytes per outgoing TCP flow
11 # of packets per incoming TCP flow
12 # of packets per outgoing TCP flow
13 # of distinct window size for incoming TCP flows
14 Entropy of window size for incoming TCP flows
15 # of distinct TTL values for incoming TCP flows
16 Entropy of TTL values for incoming TCP flows
17 # of distinct src ports for incoming TCP flows
18 Entropy of src port for incoming TCP flows
19 # of distinct dst ports for incoming TCP flows
20 Entropy of dst ports for incoming TCP flows
21 Fraction of dst ports ≤ 1024 for incoming TCP flows
22 Fraction of dst port > 1024 for incoming TCP flows
23 Fraction of TCP incoming flows with SYN flag set
24 Fraction of TCP outgoing flows with SYN flag set
25 Fraction of TCP incoming flows with ACK flag set
26 Fraction of TCP outgoing flows with ACK flag set
27 Fraction of TCP incoming flows with URG flag set
28 Fraction of TCP outgoing flows with URG flag set
29 Fraction of TCP incoming flows with FIN flag set
30 Fraction of TCP outgoing flows with FIN flag set
31 Fraction of TCP incoming flows with RST flag set
32 Fraction of TCP outgoing flows with RST flag set
33 Fraction of TCP incoming flows with PUSH flag set
34 Fraction of TCP outgoing flows with PUSH flag set
Table 2: Features extracted for TCP flows
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# Feature Description
35 # of incoming UDP flows
36 Fraction of UDP flows over total incoming flows
37 # of outgoing UDP flows
38 Fraction of UDP flows over total outgoing flows
39 Fraction of symmetric incoming UDP flows
40 Fraction of asymmetric incoming UDP flows
41 # of distinct src IP for incoming UDP flows
42 Entropy of src IP for incoming UDP flows
43 Bytes per incoming UDP flow
44 Bytes per outgoing UDP flow
45 # of packets per incoming UDP flow
46 # of packets per outgoing UDP flow
47 # of distinct src ports for incoming UDP flows
48 Entropy of src ports for incoming UDP flows
49 # of distinct dst ports for incoming UDP flows
50 Entropy of dst ports for incoming UDP flows
51 Fraction of dst port ≤ 1024 for incoming UDP flows
52 Fraction of dst port > 1024 for incoming UDP flows
53 # of distinct TTL values for incoming UDP flows
54 Entropy of TTL values for incoming UDP flows
Table 3: Features extracted for UDP flows
# Feature Description
55 # of incoming ICMP flows
56 Fraction of ICMP flows over total incoming flows
57 # of outgoing ICMP flows
58 Fraction of ICMP flows over total outgoing flows
59 Fraction of symmetric incoming ICMP flows
60 # of asymmetric incoming ICMP flows
61 # of distinct src IP for incoming ICMP flows
62 Entropy of src IP for incoming ICMP flows
63 Bytes per incoming ICMP flow
64 Bytes per outgoing ICMP flow
65 # of packets per incoming ICMP flow
66 # of packets per outgoing ICMP flow
67 # of distinct TTL values for incoming ICMP flows
68 Entropy of TTL values for incoming ICMP flows
Table 4: Features extracted for ICMP flows
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Traffic class
# of records
Training Test
Normal (N) 49179 21076
Attack
TCP (T) 5471 2344
UDP (U) 5273 2260
ICMP (I) 1602 686
TCP & UDP (TU) 4694 2011
TCP & ICMP (TI) 4739 2031
UDP & ICMP (UI) 4437 1902
All (A) 5615 2407
Table 5: Number of records in the training and test datasets for normal and different attack traffic
testbed on the same ESXi host similar to [16] that consists of an SDN controller, an OF switch, and
a network host using Ubuntu Linux systems. We used POX [6], a Python based controller, with our
DDoS detection application running on it in the controller system and installed OpenvSwitch [5] in
the switch to use it as an OF switch. In the host system, we used tcpreplay [8] to replay traffic
traces for normal and attack traffic one at a time. We saved features computed by the FE for each
interval in dataset files for the training of TC module. We set the interval 60s in the timer function
to trigger the FE module for feature extraction. We divided the dataset files into training and test
datasets. Table 5 shows the distribution of records in the dataset. Traffic features in the datasets
are real-valued positive numbers. We normalize them using max − min normalization shown in
Eqn. 5, before passing them to the TC module.
Xnorm =
xi − xmin
xmax − xmin , ∀xi ∈ X (5)
xmin = smallest value in X
xmax = largest value in X
5.2 Results
We evaluated the performance of our system on the datasets specified in Table 5 using parameters
including accuracy, precision, recall, f-measure, ROC. We use confusion matrix to calculate precision,
recall, and f-measure. A confusion matrix, M , is an N×N matrix where N is the number of classes.
It represents the actual and predicted classes in such a way that columns are labeled for actual
classes, and rows are labeled for predicted classes for all records. The diagonal elements of the matrix
represent the true-positive (TP) for each class, sum of the matrix elements along a row excluding the
diagonal element represents the number of false-positive (FP) for a class corresponding to that row,
sum of the matrix elements along a column excluding the diagonal element represents the number
of false-negative (FN) for a class corresponding to that column. Following are definitions of various
performance parameters:
• Accuracy (A): percentage of accurately classified records in a dataset
A =
Accurately classified records
Total records
× 100 (6)
• Precision (P): number of accurately predicted records over all predicted records for a particular
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class. Using the confusion matrix, M , precision for each class, j, can be defined as follows:
Pj =
TPj
TPj + FPj
× 100
=
Mj,j
Mj,j +
∑N
i=1
i 6=j
Mj,i
× 100 (7)
• Recall (R): number of accurately predicted records over all the records available for a particular
class in the dataset. Using the confusion matrix, M , recall for each class, j, can be defined as
follows:
Rj =
TPj
TPj + FNj
× 100
=
Mj,j
Mj,j +
∑N
i=1
i6=j
Mi,j
× 100 (8)
• F-measure (F): It uses precision and recall for the holistic evaluation of a model and is repre-
sented as the harmonic mean of them. For each class, j, it is defined as follows:
Fj =
2× Pj ×Rj
Pj + Rj
× 100 (9)
• Receiver Operating Curve (ROC): It helps in visualizing a classifier’s performance by plotting
the true-positive rate against false-positive rate of the classifier. The area under the ROC
gives an estimate of an average performance of the classifier. Higher the area, greater is the
performance.
Figure 4: Confusion matrix for 8-class classification in the SAE model
We used the training dataset to develop the SAE classification model for the TC module and test
dataset for performance evaluation. First, we developed the model for 8-class traffic classification
including normal and seven kinds of DDoS attack that occur in combination with TCP, UDP, and
ICMP based traffic. To make a better comparison, we also developed separate attack detection
models with soft-max and neural network (NN) which are building blocks of SAE. As observed from
Table 6, the SAE model achieved better performance compared to the soft-max and neural network
model in terms of accuracy. We computed precision, recall, f-measure for each traffic class. Figure 5
shows their values which are derived from the confusion matrix shown in Figure 4. As seen from
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Figure 5: Precision, recall, and f-measure for 8-class
Figure 6: ROC curve for 8-class classification
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Method Accuracy (in %)
Soft-max 94.30
Neural Network 95.23
SAE 95.65
Table 6: Classification accuracy comparison among soft-max, neural network, and SAE based models
the figure, the model has f-measure value above 90% for normal, TCP, UDP, and UDP with ICMP
attacks traffic. It has comparatively low values of f-measure for TCP with ICMP and TCP with
UDP attacks due to their classification of other kinds of attacks as observed from the Figure 4.
However, it is observed from the same figure that the fraction of their classification as normal traffic
is less than 0.2. Figure 6 shows the ROC curve for 8 different classes. From the figure, we observe
that the true positive rate is above 90% with a false-positive rate of below 5% for all kinds of traffic
that results in the area under the ROC curve close to unity.
Figure 7: Confusion matrix for 2-class classification
We evaluated our model for 2-class classification by considering all kinds of DDoS attacks as a
single attack class to make a comparison with other works. Due to the unique nature of this work
involving deep learning based attack detection in an SDN, and unavailability of existing literature
in this specific domain, it was difficult to compare our work with other works. Figure 8 shows
the performance for 2-class classification. The model achieved detection accuracy of 99.82% with
f-measure values as 99.85% and 99.75% for normal and attack classes, respectively, derived from the
confusion matrix shown in Figure 7. On the contrary, the two closely related works [12] and [24],
achieved a detection accuracy of 99.11% in data plane and 96% in control plane, respectively. It
should be noted that both of these works did not address attack detection in the other plane.
We also measured the computational time for training and classification in our model using a
machine with Intel (R) Core i7 CPU @ 3.40 GHz processor and 16 GB RAM running Matlab 2016a
on Windows 7. Table 7 shows computational time for the training of 81,010 records and classification
of 34,717 records specified in Table 5.
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Figure 8: Accuracy, precision, recall, and f-measure for 2-class classification
Training time Classification time
524s .0835s
Table 7: Average computational time for the training and classification in the SAE model
5.3 Discussion
With our DDoS detection system, we identify individual DDoS attack class and also determine
whether an incoming traffic is normal or attack. A clear advantage in identifying each attack traffic
type separately is enabling the mitigation technique to block only a specific type of traffic causing
the attack, instead of all kinds of traffic coming towards the victim(s). Although we implemented
a detection system, we separately extracted features for each host which has incoming traffic for an
interval. Therefore, we can identify the hosts with normal traffic and the ones with attack traffic.
Accordingly, the controller can install flow rules inside the switches to block the traffic for a particular
host if it undergoes an attack.
Our proposed system has a few limitations in terms of processing capabilities. The TCFI and
FE modules collect every packet to extract features and are implemented on the controller for low
false-positive in detection. However, this approach may limit the controller’s performance in large
networks. We can overcome it by adopting a hybrid approach that can either use flow sampling or
individual packet capturing based on the observed traffic in the organizational network. Another
approach that could be employed to handle DDoS attacks in the data plane is to deploy the TCFI and
FE modules in another host, send all packets to it instead of the controller for features processing,
and then periodically notify the controller with extracted features for the TC module. To reduce the
time in feature extraction, we can also apply distributed processing similar to our another previous
work [18].
6 Conclusion
In this work, we implemented a deep learning based DDoS detection system for multi-vector attack
detection in an SDN environment. The proposed system identifies individual DDoS attack class with
an accuracy of 95.65%. It classifies the traffic in normal and attack classes with an accuracy of 99.82%
with very low false-positive compared to other works. In the future, we aim to reduce the controller’s
bottleneck and implement an NIDS that can detect different kinds of network attacks in addition
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to DDoS attack. We also plan to use deep learning for feature extraction from raw bytes of packet
headers instead of feature reduction from the derived features in future NIDS implementation.
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